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In a nutshell, agent-based models (ABM) are models, i.e. abstract repre-
sentation of the reality, in which (i) a multitude of objects interact with each
other and with the environment, (ii) the objects are autonomous, i.e. there is
no central, or “top down” control over their behavior 1, and (iii) the outcome
of their interaction is numerically computed. Since the objects are autonomous,
they are called “agents”. As Leigh Tesfatsion — one the leading researchers in
the ﬁeld and the “mother” of the ACE acronym, which describes the applica-
tion of ABM to Economics — deﬁnes it, Agent-based Computational Economics
(ACE) is
the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic
systems of interacting agents. 2
Note that none of the two features above, in isolation, deﬁnes the method-
ology: the micro-perspective implied by (i) and (ii) is the same adopted, for
instance, by game theory, where strategic interaction is investigated analyti-
cally, while the computational approach is typical of Computational General
Equilibrium or System Dynamics, which however are based on aggregate repre-
sentations of the system.
1as is the case of the Walrasian auctioneer device for ensuring market clearing, for instance.
More on this point on section 2 below.
2[Tesfatsion, 2006]
1In this paper we will describe in more details the features of ABM (section
1), oﬀer an overview of their historical development (section 2), discuss when
they can be fruitfully employed (section 2.3), and how they can be combined
with more traditional approaches.
While maintaining a “low proﬁle” in describing the approach, we will oﬀer
a strong defense of its methodological soundness (section 3). In particular, we
will argue that (i) ABM are mathematical models, (ii) ABM may lead — as
analytical models — to general results, and (iii) ABM can be taken to the
data, i.e. estimated empirically. However, in this survey paper we will not
discuss the issue of validation of agent-based models, ﬁrst of all because many
problems in validation are the same encountered with more traditional (analytic)
models. The interested reader is referred to the recent (2007) special number of
Computational Economics explicitly devoted to empirical validation of agent-
based models, and in particular to [Fagiolo et al., 2007, Marks, 2007].
1 Features of agent-based models
The basic units of ABM are “agents”. Agents can be anything from cells to
biological entities, from individuals to social groups like families or ﬁrms. Agents
can be composed by other agents: the only requirement being that they are
perceived as a unit from the outside, and that they “do” something, i.e. they
have the ability to act, and possibly to react to external stimuli and interact
with the environment and other agents.
The environment, which may include physical entities (like infrastructures,
geographical locations, etc.) and institutions (like markets, regulatory systems,
etc.) can also be modeled in terms of agents (e.g. a central bank, the or-
der book of a stock exchange, etc.), whenever the conditions outlined above
are met. When not, it should be thought of simply as a set of variables (say
2“temperature”, or “business conﬁdence”).
From what we have said so far, it should be clear that aggregate variables
like Consumption, Savings, Investments, Disposable Income etc., which are the
prime focus of analysis of Keynesian macroeconomics, are incompatible with an
agent-based framework. Nor is the ﬁctitious representation of a “Representa-
tive Agent”, a cornerstone of neoclassical economics. The direct modeling of a
demand or a supply curve is also forbidden in an agent-based setting: rather,
these aggregate functions might (or may not) emerge as the outcome of the
decisions of the individual agents.
1.1 The whole and its parts
Having agents as the unit of analysis, ABM is deeply rooted in methodological
individualism, a philosophical method aimed at explaining and understanding
broad society-wide developments as the aggregation of decisions by individuals
(REFS). 3
Methodological individualism suggests — in its most extreme version —
that the “whole” is nothing but the “sum of its parts”, a position that has been
labeled reductionism (REFS).
The opposite view is holism, the idea that all the properties of a given system
cannot be determined or explained by the sum of its component parts alone.
Instead, the system as a whole determines in an important way how the parts
behave. 4 As such, holism is closely related to organicism, introduced as a
3The use of methodological individualism in Economics was championed by the Austrian
school of Economics in the XX century, of which Friederich von Hayek has been one of the
main exponent. The legacy of Hayek to ABM and the complex system approach has been
recognized (REFS). However, methodological individualism is also considered an essential part
of modern neoclassical economics, with its analysis of collective action in terms of “rational”,
utility-maximizing individuals. Clearly, alcuni padri nobili sono tirati per la giacca da tutte
le parti. However, it is hard to recognize the imprinting of methodological individualism in
the Representative Agent paradigm, which claims that the whole society can be analyzed in
terms of the behavior of a single, representative, individual.
4The general principle of holism was concisely summarized by Aristotle in the Metaphysics:
“The whole is more than the sum of its parts”
3biological doctrine stressing the importance of the organization, rather than the
composition, of organisms. 5 This view has gained renewed popularity as a new
science of Complexity — which, as we will discuss in the next section, is to a
large extent responsible for the introduction of ABM in the study of social and
biological systems — developed in the last decades of the XX century.
So, where does ABM stand in this debate? As already noted, ABM are
characterized by the fact that aggregate outcomes (the “whole) are computed as
the sum of individual characteristics (its “parts”). However, aggregate behavior
can often be recognized as distinct from the behavior of the comprising agents,
leading to the discovery of unexpected (“emergent”) properties. In this sense,
the whole is more than — and diﬀerent from — the sum of its parts. It might
even be the case than the whole appears to act as if it followed a distinct logic,
with own goals and means, as in the example of a cartel of ﬁrms that act in order
to inﬂuence the market price of a good. From the outside, the “whole” appears
no diﬀerent from a new agent type. A new entity is born, the computational
experiment has been successful in “growing artiﬁcial societies from the bottom
up” 6.
1.2 The dual problem of the micro-macro relation
Hence, ABM can be thought of as a bridge between methodological individual-
ism and methodological holism. ABM allow to investigate the interplay occur-
ring at two diﬀerent scales of a given system: the micro structure and the macro
structure. This investigation may occur in two directions: (i) to ﬁnd the aggre-
gate implications of given individual behaviors, and (ii) to ﬁnd the conditions
at the micro level that give raise to some observed macro phenomena. We will
refer to these two perspectives as the dual problem of the micro-macro relation.
5William Emerson Ritter coined the term in 1919
6as in the title of the well known book by Joshua Epstein and Robert Axtell [Epstein and
Axtell, 1996]
4Both share the same approach: If you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it 7,
which motivates the deﬁnition of ACE as generative social science.
Of course, ABM are by no means the only way to study the dual problem
of the micro-macro relation. However, taking into account the interaction of a
multitude of (possibly heterogeneous) agents, of possibly diﬀerent types, easily
becomes analytically intractable, and the traditional approach of simplifying
everything may — as it should be clear from the discussion above — “throw
the baby out with the wash water”. On the contrary, ABM only require to
“wait and see” the unveiling of the consequences of the assumptions, and leave
much more freedom than conventional economics in the speciﬁcations of the
assumptions.
1.3 Additional features of agent-based models
We have so far introduced the three fundamental characteristics of ABM: there
are agents that play the role of actors, there is no script or Deus ex-machina 8
and the story is played “live”, i.e. computed.
However, there are a number of characteristics that are often found in ABM,
and may motivate their use. Following Epstein [Epstein, 1999, 2006] we can
include:
• Heterogeneity. While in analytical models there is a big advantage in re-
ducing the ways in which individuals diﬀer, the computational burden of
ABM does not change at all if diﬀerent values of the parameters (e.g. pref-
erences, endowments, location, social contacts, abilities etc.) are speciﬁed
for diﬀerent individuals. Normally, this is done by choosing a distribution
for each relevant parameter, and this simply implies that a few parameters
7[Epstein, 1999]
8in the Greek theater, a mechanism was used to drop one or more divinities on the stage
to solve complicated situations, in which no apparent ways out were available
5(those governing the distribution) are added to the model.
• Explicit space. This can be seen as speciﬁcation of the previous point:
individuals often diﬀer in the physical place where they are located, and
/or in the neighbors with whom they can or have to interact (which deﬁne
the network structure of the model).
• Local interaction. Again, this can be seen as a speciﬁcation of the net-
work structure connecting the agents. Analytical models often assume
either global interaction (as in Walrasian markets), or very simple local
interaction. ABM allow for much richer speciﬁcations.
• Bounded rationality. Interestingly, while in analytical models it is gen-
erally easier to implement some form of optimal behavior rather than
solving models where individuals follow “reasonable” rules of thumb, or
learn either by looking at what happened to others or what happened to
themselves in the past, for ABM the opposite is true. However, it can be
argued that real individuals also face the same diﬃculties in determining
and following the optimal behavior, and are characterized by some sort of
bounded rationality. To quote Epstein,
There are two components of this: bounded information and
bounded computing power. Agents have neither global infor-
mation nor inﬁnite computational capacity. Although they are
typically purposive, they are not global optimizers; they use
simple rules based on local information. 9
• Non-equilibrium dynamics. ABM are recursive models, in which the state
of the system at time t + 1 is computed starting from the state at time t.
9[Epstein, 2006], p. 1588
6Hence, they allow the investigation of what happens all along the route,
not only at the start and at the end of the journey.
The latter point is, we believe, the most important. W. Brian Arthur oﬀered
a beautiful and concise statement of its relevance for economic theory:
Standard neoclassical economics asks what agents’ actions, strate-
gies, or expectations are in equilibrium with (consistent with) the
outcome or pattern these behaviors aggregatively create. Agent-
based computational economics enables us to ask a wider question:
how agents’ actions, strategies or expectations might react to —
might endogenously change with — the pattern they create. In
other words, it enables us to examine how the economy behaves out
of equilibrium, when it is not at a steady state.
This out-of-equilibrium approach is not a minor adjunct to standard
economic theory; it is economics done in a more general way. [...]
The static equilibrium approach suﬀers two characteristic indeter-
minacies: it cannot easily resolve among multiple equilibria; nor can
it easily model individuals’ choices of expectations. Both problems
are ones of formation (of an equilibrium and of an “ecology” of ex-
pectations, respectively), and when analyzed in formation — that
is, out of equilibrium — these anomalies disappear. 10
10[Arthur, 2006], p. 1552
72 The development of ACE
2.1 The Santa Fe perspective: The economy as an evolv-
ing complex system
The development of agent-based computational economics is closely linked with
the work conducted at the Santa Fe Institute, a private, not-for-proﬁt, indepen-
dent research and education center founded in 1984 in Santa Fe, New Mexico.
The purpose of the Institute has been, since its foundation, to “foster multi-
disciplinary collaboration in pursuit of understanding the common themes that
arise in natural, artiﬁcial, and social systems”. This uniﬁed view is the dominant
theme of what has been called the new science of complexity. 11
For what concerns economics, the main outcomes of the research project
conducted at the Santa Fe Institute were three books, all bearing the title The
economy as an evolving complex system 12. From the preface of the 1997 volume,
edited by W. Brian Arthur, Steven Durlauf and David Lane,
In September 1987 twenty people came together at the Santa Fe
Institute to talk about “the economy as a evolving, complex system”.
Ten were theoretical economists, invited by Kenneth J. Arrow, and
ten were physicists, biologists and computer scientists, invited by
Philip W. Anderson. The meeting was motivated by the hope that
new ideas bubbling in the natural sciences, loosely tied together
under the rubric of “the sciences of complexity”, might stimulate
new ways of thinking about economic problems.
11See also, among many others, [Edmonds, 1999, Phelan, 2001, Chu et al., 2003] and es-
pecially the popular books by James Gleick [Gleick, 1987] and Mitchell Waldrop [Waldrop,
1992]. A rather critical view of the research on complex systems undertaken at the Santa Fe
Institute through the mid-1990s can be found in the writings of the science journalist John
Horgan [Horgan, 1995, 1997]. A very good account of the relationships between complexity
theory, cybernetics, catastrophe theory and chaos theory (the four “C”) and their implications
for economic theory, can be found in [Barkley Rosser Jr., 1999].
12[Anderson et al., 1988, Arthur et al., 1997, Blume and Durlauf, 2006]
8[...] But just what is the complexity perspective in economics? That
is not an easy question to answer. [...] Looking back over the de-
velopments in the past decade, and of the papers produced by the
program, we believe that a coherent perspective — sometimes called
the “Santa Fe approach” — has emerged within economics. 13
Arthur goes on in describing the main characteristics of the Santa Fe ap-
proach 14. These were identiﬁed in models having cognitive foundations, struc-
tural foundations, no global controller, and exhibiting continual adaptation, per-
petual novelty and out-of-equilibrium dynamics [Arthur, March 1989, Au-
gust 1990].
Ten years and two volumes later, Blume and Durlauf summarize this intel-
lectual Odyssey as follows:
On some levels, there has been great success. Much of the original
motivation [...] revolved around the belief that economic research
could beneﬁt from an injection of new mathematical models and
new substantive perspectives on human behavior. [...] At the same
time, this volume reﬂects some of the ways in which, at least in-
formally, some of the early aspirations were not met. The models
presented here do not represent any sort of rejection of neoclassical
economics. One reason for this is related to the misunderstanding
of many non-economists about the nature of economic theory; sim-
ply put, the theory was able to absorb SFI-type advances without
changing its fundamental nature. Put diﬀerently, economic theory
has an immense number of strengths that have been complemented
13[Arthur et al., 1997], pp. ??
14although this perspective is associated with the Santa Fe Institute, it was initiated in
Europe by chemists and physicists concerned with emergent structures and disequilibrium
dynamics (more precisely, in Brussel by the group of the Nobel prize winner physical chemist
Ilya Progogine and in Stuttgart by the group of the theoretical physicist Hermann Haken) —
see [Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989, Haken, 1983]
9Figure 1: Excerpt from the Bulletin of the Santa Fe Institute, Vol. 1, No. 1,
June 1986
and thereby enriched by the SFI approach. hence, relative to the
halcyon period of the 1980s, this SFI volume is more modest in its
claims, but we think much stronger in its achievements. 15
2.2 The birth of agent-based computer platforms
Crucial for the development of agent-based modeling has been — quite naturally
— the increasing availability of computing power 16, which allowed to run even
15[Blume and Durlauf, 2006], pp. 1-2
16summarized by the empirical law of a twofold increase in performance every 2 years
10complicated simulations on small PCs. 17
Together with continuous hardware improvements came software develop-
ment. Aside traditional programming (e.g. in Fortran, C++, etc.) three diﬀer-
ent approaches emerged. The ﬁrst relies on general-purpose mathematical soft-
ware, like Mathematica, Mathlab or Matcad. The second, exempliﬁed by the
Starlogo/Netlogo experience 18, is based on the idea of an agent-based speciﬁc
language. The third represents a protocol in the design process, implemented
as agent-based speciﬁc libraries in standard programming languages (like Java)
19. The ancestor of these agent-based tools, which was initially developed at the
Santa Fe Institute itself, is Swarm 20. The principles of the Swarm approach
are:
• the use of object-oriented programming language, with diﬀerent objects
(and object types) being a natural counterpart for diﬀerent agents (and
agent types);
• a separate implementation of the model and the tools used for monitoring
and conducting experiments on the model (the so called “Observer”);
• an architecture that allows nesting models one into another, in order to
build a hierarchy of “swarms” — a swarm being a group of objects and a
schedule of actions that the objects execute. One swarm can thus contain
lower-level swarms whose schedules are integrated into the higher-level
schedule.
Finally, despite the fact that ABM are most often computer models, and
17It is worth remembering that some of the brightest minds of their time — gathered
together around physicists Robert Oppenheimer under the Manhattan project, the World
War II U.S. Army project at Los Alamos developing the atomic bomb — were reported to
spend half of their time and eﬀort in order to ﬁnd smarter algorithms and save precious
computing time on the huge but slow machines available at the time [Gleick, 1992].
18[Resnick, 1994]
19this allows the possibility to integrate tools developed as separate libraries by third parties
(e.g. for graphical visualization, statistical analysis, database management, etc.
20[Askenazi et al., 1996]
11that the methodology could not develop in the absence of cheap and easy-to-
handle personal computers, it is beneﬁcial to remember that one of the most
well-known agent-based models, the pioneering work on spatial segregation by
the Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling 21. As Schelling recalls, he had the original
idea while seating on plane, and investigated it with paper and pencil. When he
arrived home, he explained his son the rules of the game and got him to move
zincs and coppers from the child’s own collection on a checkerboard, looking for
the results. “The dynamics were suﬃciently intriguing to keep my twelve-year-
old engage”. [Schelling, 2006]
2.3 Why agents
Although agent-based computational economics developed together with the
Santa Fe approach, its applicability is by no way limited to the analysis of
complex systems. Abstracting from the characteristics of the system being
modeled, ABM prove valuable in two cases:
• to get a quick intuition of the dynamics that the system is able to produce,
and
• to thoroughly investigate models that are not susceptible of a more tra-
ditional analysis, or are susceptible of a more traditional analysis only at
too a high cost.
Often, an agent-based model can be quickly implemented, and can be used
not diﬀerently from scrap paper. It allows to experiment with hypothesis and
assumptions, and gives a hint to which results can be proved. It often suggests
the reﬁnements that might eventually lead to a fully algebraic solution of the
model.
21[Schelling, 1971]
12However, it might turn out that an analytical solution is not even neces-
sary, or not feasible. Building on Robert Axtell 22, it is possible to identify
three distinct uses of agent-based models in the social sciences, a part from the
“scrap paper” use described above. These uses can be ranked according to their
auxiliary nature, with respect to analytical modeling 23.
The ﬁrst use is numerical computation of analytical models. Note with Axtell
that
“[t]here are a variety of ways in which formal models resist full anal-
ysis. Indeed, it is seemingly only in very restrictive circumstances
that one ever has a model that is completely soluble, in the sense
that everything of importance about it can be obtained solely from
analytical manipulations”.
Situations in which resort to numerical computation may prove useful include
(a) when a model is not analytically soluble for some relevant variable, (b) when
a model is stochastic, and the empirical distribution of some relevant variable
needs to be compared with the theoretical one, of which often few moments are
known, (c) when a model is solved for the equilibrium, but the out-of-equilibrium
dynamics are not known. In particular, with reference to the last point, it may
happen that multiple equilibria exist, that the equilibrium or (at least some of)
the equilibria are unstable, that they are realized only in the very long run.
Conversely, it may happen that equilibria exist but are not computable. 24
Finally, it may be the case that the equilibrium is less important than the out-
of-equilibrium ﬂuctuations or extreme events. Clearly, agent-based simulations
are not the only way to perform numerical computations of a given analytical
model. However, they may prove eﬀective and simple to implement, especially
22[Axtell, 2000]
23the categories identiﬁed below correspond only partially to Axtell’s.
24Axtell provides references and examples for each case.
13for models with micro-foundations.
The second use is testing the robustness of analytical models with respect
to departures from some of the assumptions. Assumptions may relate to the
behavior of the agents, or to the structure of the model. Note that, in general,
as the assumptions are relaxed or altered an analytical solution becomes very
improbable (otherwise, the possibility of changing them could have been easily
incorporated in the original work, leading to a more general model). One im-
portant feature of ACE is that in considering departures from the assumptions
of the reference model, a number of diﬀerent alternatives can be investigated,
thus oﬀering intuition toward a further generalization of the model itself.
The ﬁrst two uses of ACE models are complementary to mathematical anal-
ysis. The third use is a substitute, going beyond the existence of an analytical
reference model. It provides stand-alone simulation models for (a) problems
that are analytically intractable, or (b) problems for which an analytical solution
bears no advantage. The latter may happen when negative results are involved,
for instance. A simulation may be enough to show that some institution or norm
is wrong, or does not work in the intended way. Analytical intractability may
arise when more complicated assumptions are needed, or when the researcher
wants to investigate the overall eﬀect of a number of mechanisms (each possibly
already analytically understood in simpler models), at work at the same time.
3 The methodological status of ACE
A rather common misunderstanding about simulations is that they are not as
sound as mathematical models. In particular, they do not oﬀer a compact set of
equations – together with their inevitable algebraic solution – which can easily
be interpreted and generalized.
14In a frequently cited article 25, Thomas Ostrom argued that computer sim-
ulation is a third symbol system in its own right, aside verbal description and
mathematics. This implies that “[s]imulation is neither good nor bad mathe-
matics, but no mathematics at all” 26. Computer simulations are, according to
this view, characterized by an intermediate level of abstraction: they are more
abstract than verbal descriptions but less abstract than “pure” mathematics.
Ostrom also argued that “[a]ny theory that can be expressed in either of the
ﬁrst two symbol systems can also be expressed in the third symbol system.” 27.
This implies that “there might be verbal theories which cannot be adequately
expressed in the second symbol system of mathematics, but can be in the third”
28.
This view has become increasingly popular among social simulators them-
selves, apparently because it oﬀers a shield to the perplexity of the mathe-
maticians, while hinting at a sort of superiority of computer simulations. Our
opinion is that both statements are simply and plainly wrong. Simulation is
mathematics, as we argue in this paragraph. Moreover, the conjecture that any
theory can be expressed via simulation is easily contradicted: think for instance
at philosophical theories.
Actually, simulations do consist of a well-deﬁned (although not concise) set
of functions. 29 These functions, which may be either deterministic or stochastic
30, describe a fully recursive system and unambiguously deﬁne the macro dy-
namics of the system. Moreover, the eventual unique equilibrium of the macro
dynamics is, in turn, a known function of the structural parameters and initial
25Ostrom [1988]
26Gilbert and Troitzsch [1999]
27ibidem, p. 384
28Gilbert and Troitzsch [1999]
29This section is based on [Leombruni and Richiardi, 2005]. For an advanced mathematical
treatment, see [Epstein, 2006]
30in what follows we will refer to the deterministic case. Generalization to the stochastic
case requires some changes (mainly regarding the notation), but the idea remains the same
15conditions of the simulation. We will show here that the only diﬀerence from a
model consisting of an algebraically solved set of equations is in the degree of
knowledge that we have about these functions. Let us start from the following
general characterization of dynamic micro models. Assume that at each time t
an individual i, i ∈ 1...n, is well described by a state variable xi,t ∈ ℜk. Let
the evolution of her state variable be speciﬁed by the diﬀerence equation:
xi,t+1 = fi(xi,t,x−i,t;αi). (1)
where we assume that the behavioral rules31 may be individual-speciﬁc both
in the functional form of the phase line fi(.) and in the parameters αi, and may
also be based on the state x−i of all individuals other than i. Once we have
speciﬁed the behavior of each individual, we will typically be interested in some
macro feature of our economy, that we may represent as a statistic Y deﬁned
over the entire population:
Yt = s(x1,t,...,xn,t). (2)
The crucial question now is whether it is possible to solve equation (2) for
each t, regardless of the speciﬁcation adopted for fi(.), and the answer is that
a solution can always be found by iteratively solving each term xi,t in (2) using
(1):
31here and in the following we use “behavioral rules” and similar terms in a loose sense that









The law of motion (3) uniquely relates the value of Y at any time t to
the initial conditions of the system and to the values of the parameters αi.
Sometimes32, gt may converge to a function not dependent on t 33, so that we
also have an expression for the equilibrium value of Y , again as a function of
the initial conditions and parameters:
Y e = lim
t→∞Yt ≡ g(x1,0,...,xn,0;α1,...,αn), (4)
Notice that this formalization describes both “traditional” dynamic micro
models and agent-based simulations. Indeed, given this common framework, it
is easy to discuss the alleged diﬀerences in terms of “mathematical soundness”.
To explore this point, let us consider how the framework is implemented in the
two approaches. As an example of the “traditional approach” think of a model
based on a representative agent. The behavioral rule (1), will be very simple
in structure, since all subscripts i can be dropped, along with any reference
to other individuals’ behavior. In turn, any “macro” statistic considered will
collapse on a transformation of the state variable of just one individual, and
the resulting law of motion (3) will also be very simple. We thus end up with a
simple formulation for all equations (1)-(3), and usually also for equation (4). By
32when the dynamic system has one (or more), stable equilibrium and the initial conditions
lie in its (their) basin of attraction.
33or even not dependent on the initial conditions
17“simple formulations” we mean that they can be manipulated algebraically, and
general propositions about the model can be stated by computing derivatives,
comparing diﬀerent equilibrium solutions, and so on. 34
Let us turn to the agent-based simulation approach. The critical factor rests
in the formula for the macro dynamics (3), the law of motion of Y . As t and
n get higher, the expression for gt(.) can easily grow enormous, hindering any
attempt at symbolic manipulation, i.e. any attempt to solve it algebraically.35
Nevertheless, the functions (3) are completely speciﬁed. It is thus possible to
explore their local behavior, by computing the value of Y corresponding to dif-
ferent values of the parameters and the initial conditions. A way to extrapolate
this point evidence, and thus to recover a local approximation of the shape of
gt(.), is to specify a functional form ˆ gt(x1,0,...,xn,0,α1,...,αn,β) to be ﬁtted
on the artiﬁcial data generated by the simulation runs, where β are the coeﬃ-
cients of ˆ gt(.). For instance, if ˆ gt(.) is assumed to be linear, there will be two
coeﬃcients β0 and β1 (the intercept and the slope) to be estimated in the ar-
tiﬁcial data. The use of econometric techniques to approximate gt(.), starting
from a number of - somehow designed - artiﬁcial experiments is indeed com-
mon practice in the computer science literature. The resulting regression model
is also known as metamodel, response surface, compact model, emulator, etc.
[Kleijnen, 1998].
3.1 Interpretation of the results
A cause of concern with this procedure stems from the possibility that the
artiﬁcial data may not be representative of all outcomes the model can produce.
In other words, it is possible that as soon as we move to diﬀerent values of the
34Note that the problem of deriving the equilibrium relation (4) from the law of motion (3)
is often skipped altogether. Equilibrium conditions are externally imposed, and the dynamics
towards the equilibrium is simply ignored: the system “jumps” to the equilibrium.
35This diﬃculty is the same experienced in game theory models, where games typically
become intractable if they involve more than a handful of players.
18parameters, the behavior of gt(.) will change dramatically. The metamodel ˆ gt(.)
will then become a poor description of the simulated world. At a theoretical
level, this issue can be answered with two observations. First, if it applies to
what we know about the artiﬁcial world deﬁned by the simulation model, it
also applies to what we know about the real world. As the real data generating
process is itself unknown, stylized facts could in principle go wrong at some
point in time. Second, we should not worry too much about the behavior
of a model for particular “evil” combinations of the parameters, as long as
these combinations remain extremely rare.36 If the design of the experiments
is suﬃciently accurate (often particular combinations of the relevant parameter
can be guessed, and oversampled in the artiﬁcial experiments), the problem of
how “local” the estimated local data generating process is becomes marginal.
3.2 Estimation
So far we have shown that (i) ABM are mathematical models, and (ii) they can
be used to get general results. We will now brieﬂy show that they can also be
“taken to the data”, i.e. estimated. Estimation means using real data to assign
speciﬁc values to the structural parameters of the model.
Simulations produce streams of artiﬁcial data. To estimate the structural
parameters of a simulation, all that is needed is to compare these artiﬁcial
data with the real data. The structural parameters can be changed until the
artiﬁcial data become as similar as possible to the real data. This strategy is
called indirect inference, and it generally involves deﬁning some statistics to
be computed both on artiﬁcial and on real data, together with a measure of
36The relevant exception is when rare events are themselves the focus of the investigation, for
instance as in risk management. Here, simulations may prove extremely useful, by dispensing
from making assumptions - such as the gaussian distribution of some relevant parameters -
which may be necessary in order to derive algebraic results but have unpleasant properties -
like excessively thin tails. In a simulation, the reproduction of such rare events is limited only
by the computational burden imposed on the computer. However, techniques can be used in
order to artiﬁcially increase the likelihood of their occurrence.
19the distance between the statistics computed on the artiﬁcial data and those
computed on the real data. The use of appropriate algorithms suggests the
direction in which to change the structural parameters until this distance is
minimized.
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